SAFERWORLD

Establishing a Civil Society Network on Small Arms and Light Weapons in Southern Sudan

Reflections on first steps

Thomas Wheeler with **Simon Rynn**

December 2009

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Acknowledgements

Contents

Acronyms

CBO	community-based organisation
CPA	Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CSAC	community security and arms control
CSSAC-B	Community Security and Small Arms Control Bureau
CSO	civil society organisation
GNU	Government of National Unity
GoSS	Government of Southern Sudan
NESI	New Sudan Indigenous NGO Network
NGO	non-governmental organisation
LRA	Lord's Resistance Army
ORC	Office of the Resident Co-ordinator
SALW	small arms and light weapons
SCC	Sudan Council of Churches
SPLM	Sudan People's Liberation Movement
SSANSA	Southern Sudan Action Network on Small Arms
SSDDRC	Southern Sudan Demobilisation, Disarmament and Reintegration Commission
SSLA	Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly
SSRRC	Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission
TF	Task Force
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme

Executive summary

IN 2005, Southern Sudan emerged from a brutal 22 year civil war. But despite a cessation of state-level armed conflict, the semi-autonomous territory remains poor and fraught with numerous conflicts to which inter-tribal differences, militias, corruption, state weakness and the widespread availability of small arms and light weapons (SALW) all contribute. Sudanese civil society, North and South, played an important role in maintaining basic human security during the conflict period, with a range of organisations campaigning for peace or distributing aid to a needy population.

Working together with others, Saferworld has sought to build on Sudanese civil society's historical engagement with such issues by supporting the formation of a network of organisations dedicated to addressing small arms problems in the new post-war context of Southern Sudan – the Southern Sudanese Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA).

Saferworld has been working in Southern Sudan since 2006 with a focus on building capacity to mitigate violent conflict and improve community security within both the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) and civil society. From 2007 onwards, Saferworld provided technical advice and facilitation support to a new GoSS entity mandated to, "contribute to human security through building collaborative capacity and co-operation to address the threat posed by small arms and community insecurity to peace, confidence and development in Southern Sudan." The Community Security and Small Arms Control (CSSAC) Bureau, established in 2007, is envisaged as a co-ordination body on these issues that would set policy and strategy together with other GoSS agencies. Along with others, notably UNDP, Saferworld has provided technical support to the Bureau, assisting the new organisation to develop a clear mandate, policy and strategy and supporting its outreach efforts to other institutions, to the State authorities and to communities.

However, Saferworld has also worked to mobilise and capacitate Southern Sudan's nascent civil society through the establishment of SSANSA. It is this network which is the main subject of this paper, which attempts to draw some general lessons from this work for those seeking to support and encourage civil society engagement on arms control and community security issues in Southern Sudan. Based on an internal review carried out in August 2009, the report details the methods used to identify, capacitate and mobilise member organisations and assesses the effectiveness of these efforts. It also offers reflections on the nature of civil society in Southern Sudan and the most appropriate means to build a diverse, capable and legitimate civil society constituency on these difficult issues in the future.

Section one of the report provides context, summarising the issues at stake and the nature and state of civil society in contemporary Southern Sudan. Section two

provides an overview of Saferworld's support to the formation and mobilisation of the SSANSA network, focussing on the strengths and weaknesses of the support offered at each stage. Section three draws out some lessons and makes recommendations for support in these areas in future, whether by Saferworld or others.

1

Background

Security in Southern Sudan

IN JANUARY 2005 the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) was signed, marking an end to Africa's longest civil war in which an estimated 1.4 million people lost their lives and more than 4 million were forced from their homes.[1] With the signing of the peace agreement, the Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM) became a national-level partner in the Government of National Unity (GNU) and took overwhelming control in the newly established Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS). Nevertheless, since 2005 the reward of self-government for those living in Southern Sudan has been hampered by serious capacity constraints, administrative weaknesses, a war-ravaged infrastructure and political infighting. This has led to restrictions on access to basic public goods such as clean water, health and education. Of equal – if not more – importance is the fact that peace itself has been challenged by continued insecurity, violence and volatility.

"The security and welfare of the people of Southern Sudan shall be the primary duty of all levels of government in Southern Sudan."
Source: Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan, Article 39 (3).

Across Southern Sudan pervasive armed violence has driven insecurity from multiple sources. Militias left over from the civil war and other non-state armed groups, such as cattle or community protection guards, which were not adequately dealt with under the CPA, have clashed with government forces and preyed on civilians and their property.[2] Localised and parallel conflicts which were not adequately addressed by the CPA have continued and become entrenched into the wider north-south struggle or within southern political dynamics due to the increasing politicisation of tribal or ethnic identities.[3] Many of these conflicts have disputes over land, pasture and water resources at their roots, especially those between pastoralists and settled sedentary farmers. In addition, militias from bordering countries, most notably the Ugandan Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), have terrorised some border communities.

In a context where state provision of public security is weak and patchy, communities historically relied on traditional, tribal mechanisms as security guarantors. In the wake of civil war however, these mechanisms have been undermined, including through an influx of small arms and light weapons (SALW).[4] Civilian armament may allow rudimentary self-defence at the household level and enhance feelings of security in

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1 Johnson, Douglas, *The Root Causes of Sudan's Civil Wars* (Oxford: James Currey, 2003)
2 Schomerus, Mareike, *Violent Legacies: Insecurity in Sudan's Central and Eastern Equatoria*, HBSA Working Paper 13 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2008)
3 Ibid, p.31
4 One estimate puts the number of weapons in the hands of civilians at two-thirds of an estimated total 1.9–3.2 million small arms across Sudan, outside the remit of either the formal state security services or the country's many armed groups. *The Militarization of Sudan: A preliminary review of arms flows and holdings*, HSBA Sudan Issue Brief No.6, April 2007 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007) p.2.

the short-term,[5] but their ready availability on a large scale in the absence of effective control mechanisms has contributed to societal crime and violence and facilitated increasingly vicious inter-tribal attacks. Knock-on effects include restricted movement and reduced access to basic services for the population as a result of chronic violence and uncertainty.

More seriously the central aspect of the CPA for Southern Sudan's population was that it would bring peace and prosperity. Without this peace dividend, people are losing faith in the government, the CPA process and the future of Southern Sudan.

Civilian disarmament has been at the core of the government's response to continued insecurity. It is seen not only as a means to "gain a monopoly on the use of force" – a fundamental state function and essential to its provision of public security – but also as a way to "neutralise potential spoilers and fend off threats from the North while preventing internal fragmentation."[6] In 2005–06 the government implemented a large-scale civilian disarmament in Jongeli state. While 3,000 weapons were collected, the process led to armed resistance from some communities and the loss of over 1,600 lives.[7] In the following few years state- and local-level authorities have driven more *ad hoc* disarmament initiatives in especially violent areas under their authority. For example, in May 2008 an executive order from President Salva Kiir called for comprehensive civilian disarmament over six months across all ten states. It was to be implemented by state governors supported by the SPLA. However insecurity continued: by November 2008, a total of 187,000 people were estimated to have been displaced by internal conflicts since January 2008.[8]

> **Box 1: Rising community insecurity in early 2009**
>
> In March 2009 alone nearly 700 people were killed in a month of tribal clashes in Jonglei state resulting from cattle raids and counter-raiding. So far over 1,000 people have been killed in clashes since the start of the year, and more than 135,000 displaced. In response to rising insecurity, Southern Sudan President Salva Kiir announced that, "*we will soon affect a comprehensive disarmament of all civilian populations in Southern Sudan*".
>
> Sources: 'Sudan: Violence scaring of returnees in Jonglei', IRIN News Agency, 26 March 2009; Kilner, Derek, 'Southern Sudan to Launch Civilian Disarmament' *Voice of America News*, 27 May 2009; 'Showdown looms as Kiir orders arms surrender', *Daily Nation*, 23 June 2009.

Civil society in Southern Sudan

Civil society is generally understood as those non-state voluntary associations, organisations and networks in a society which publicly express their interests, priorities, grievances and values. Civil society organisations include formally organised non-governmental organisations (NGOs), community-based organisations (CBOs) and advocacy groups, but also groups representing particular interests (e.g. professional associations, women's, faith-based or youth groups). Traditional authorities (chiefs and elders), may also sometimes be categorised as civil society.

On the basis of this definition, Southern Sudanese civil society is weak in some areas, but strong in others. Many humanitarian NGOs for example, grew up in the 1980s during relief efforts. Other CSOs from both north and south were active in trying to promote a peaceful settlement to the conflict, despite limited influence over the CPA. Faith-based groups have a longer history still, and significant reach and capacity across Southern Sudan.

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5 In a survey conducted in Eastern Equatoria State, 80% of respondents said that arms made them feel safer. McEvoy & Murray, 2008, p.14
6 O'Brien, Adam, *Shots in the Dark: The 2008 South Sudan Civilian Disarmament Campaign*, HBSA Working Paper 16 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2009) p.18
7 Garfield, Richard, *Violence and Victimization after Civilian Disarmament: The Case of Jonglei*, HSBA Working Paper 11 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey, 2007) p.21
8 IRIN News Agency, *Sudan: Violence scaring of returnees in Jonglei*, IRIN News Agency, 26 March 2009

In many respects then, Sudanese civil society has a proven interest and track record on issues related to SALW. And in some cases, (see Box 2), Southern Sudanese civil society is already active in supporting arms control efforts. Indeed civil society organisations in Southern Sudan, as elsewhere, may enjoy comparative advantages over governments when it comes to activities such as public awareness-raising and research, since in post-war environments they are often trusted more readily than the state or its security forces. However, given the challenges of Southern Sudan and the ensuing capacity problems it faces, considerable support is obviously needed for civil society to eventually realise its wide-ranging potential for action on SALW, including not just research and awareness-raising but also supporting the development of laws and policies and monitoring their implementation by government.

Box 2: Civil society involvement in Akobo County, Jonglei

While civilian disarmament initiatives have generally been top-down government led programmes, there are some exceptions. Concerned about the disarmament-related violence spreading elsewhere in Jonglei during the 2006 campaign, the UN worked with Commissioner Doyak Chol and key local actors to promote a peaceful firearms collection in Akobo County. Although military coercion was threatened should it fail, the process was largely a voluntary initiative. A ceasefire was negotiated between two conflicting communities and a plan for reciprocal disarmament began in July 2006. It was organised by chiefs and administered by county-, *payam*- (small village) and community-level disarmament committees. Civil society members were mobilised to raise awareness and sensitise communities while others were taught to clear, register and store weapons. By August, roughly 1,400 assault rifles, machine guns, rocket-propelled grenade launchers and mortars had been collected in a process that, unlike elsewhere in Jonglei, was overwhelmingly peaceful.

Source: see for example, 'Anatomy of civilian disarmament in Jonglei State: recent experiences and implications', Sudan Issue Brief Number 3 (2nd edition), November 2006–February 2007 (Geneva: Small Arms Survey)

2

Establishing
the network

BETWEEN JUNE AND AUGUST 2007 Saferworld took a first step towards supporting and mobilising civil society. A scoping study was carried out through a series of meetings and consultations with a broad range of international NGOs and Southern Sudanese civil society actors in Nairobi, Juba and Eastern Equatoria state. The study was intended to inform the design of Saferworld's longer-term civil society strategy and programme and to identify potential partnerships and areas for co-operation. The scoping process investigated the profiles of civil society actors, the broader operating context for civil society in Southern Sudan and the challenges for working on security-related issues faced by civil society. It was by no means exhaustive however. For example, many smaller and state-level CBOs could not be assessed in the time available and only rudimentary capacity assessment of capacities could be made.

Some of the findings of the scoping process, which painted a broad picture of the current state of civil society in Southern Sudan, are summarised below:

Key actors:

■ Given their historical role during the war, unsurprisingly perhaps, **church groups** were found to be the strongest and most well-networked elements of civil society with strong relationships and potential influence over the SPLM, most notably through having representatives on some State Security Committees. Furthermore, church groups have sufficient capacity to reach and represent Christian communities across the South. In the past church groups had mobilised grass-roots peace dialogues and had been strong advocates for peace initiatives during the war. These groups often partner and have linkages with church-based international NGOs. The umbrella organisation for Christian groups is the Sudan Council of Churches (SCC) – which was found to have wide reaching penetration across Sudan through its membership, significant influence over the GoSS and strong links with international partners – is a key actor on peace and security issues. While such groups had limited exposure to SALW or community security issues specifically, they were seen as key potential partners.

"Disarmament of civilians needs to be a slow and consultative process. People must accept in their own minds that it is good to give up their own weapons and trust that the state will protect them. Indeed it is also up to civil society to make sure that security provision is not anti-people and to make sure that instead policies are pro-people."
SSANSA Central Steering Committee Member, May 2009.

"We have to started to work together with the community. Instead of using force to take arms away from the people, it should be done through the community, the leaders, chiefs, elders of the villages. It would be peaceful and everybody would surrender arms without causing problems."

Southern Sudan Deputy Inspector-General of Police. Quoted in 'Sudan: Civilian disarmament remains elusive and government rethinks process', IRIN News Agency, 3 December 2008.

■ **Traditional leaders** were seen as key actors due to the significant authority they wield at the village *payam* and even county level and the fact that they hold critical information on their communities. Furthermore they manage traditional law, judicial and conflict dispute resolution mechanisms. Lastly they are often represented on peace committees and councils. For example the Nuer Peace Council is a body comprised of representatives from across the Nuer communities and seeks to maintain peace among them.

■ **Women's groups** were found to play an important grassroots role at the community level focusing on a wide host of issues, including disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration processes.

■ **Youth groups** were found to be substantial in number and potentially key actors. Although many lacked sufficient capacity, they provide a channel to a large marginalised and at-risk group.

■ **Local NGOs and CBOs** were found to be numerous at the community level across Southern Sudan but with a usually small area of operation and very limited capacity. They were generally found to represent the interests of their communities and use their organisations as a means to leverage funds and development assistance back to these communities. As a result many of them lacked specialisation and instead focused on a wide variety of topics, shaping their work to mirror issues that will attract funding. Nonetheless, the New Sudan Indigenous NGO Network (NESI), established in 2000 with over 600 members, was seen as a key civil society actor despite its capacity limits.

■ Indeed **civil society networks** were found to be playing an increasingly important role as in recent years CSOs have sought to build their strength and establish a more independent position through working together. One actor identified was the newly formed SSANSA which despite weak capacity and operating structures was seen as an important potential actor.

An analysis was also conducted on the wider **operating context**. It found that the laws and procedures that exist to regulate CSOs were generally permissive despite some bureaucratic delays with NGO registration. It also found that some political space has opened for CSOs to operate in the security sector in Southern Sudan, (e.g. on the highly sensitive issue of defence reform where a major internationally-supported initiative, the 'Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation Process', has explicitly recognised the importance of oversight by civil society and has set resources aside to support this). And at the time the study was carried out, the GoSS was starting to encourage and be open to an advocacy role for civil society in other new areas, most notably in local government planning processes.

"The GoSS is pretty supportive of civil society and within limitations it is keen to support our work in a positive way."

SSANSA Steering Committee Member, author's interview, May 2009.

Yet despite civil society's track record on human security issues and a relatively favourable context for action, plenty of challenges were identified in the actor and context mappings for those wishing to work on security issues:

■ Many CSO individuals with high capacity and experience were recruited into government positions after 2005, leaving civil society weaker.

■ Despite its encouragement and support for civil society work and new opportunities listed previously, the state is not used to consulting civil society on its security policies and programmes. By and large security issues remain a sensitive and contentious area for civil society advocacy and the government is often unwilling to disclose and share relevant information.

■ CSOs have generally had experience in service delivery of humanitarian assistance and in some cases developmental programming. Experience in research, policy and advocacy on government policy and legislation is lacking, as too is experience in awareness-raising.

■ Specific knowledge and experience on small arms control and security issues is generally low.

■ Capacity weaknesses in financial and human resources as well as institutional limitations are a constraint on CSO capabilities.

■ Many CSOs are concentrated in urban areas while poor communication networks and transport infrastructure constrain CSO access to many communities.

■ Close links between many CSOs and GoSS in some cases might limit civil society independence.

■ Some political and ethnic divisions within broader civil society manifest themselves in CSOs.

■ Voluntary participation in many CSOs means that sustaining momentum can be difficult.

■ Reliance on external donor funding means that CSOs can be competitive with one another instead of collaborative.

Step two: The formation of the Task Force

In March 2008, Saferworld joined with a number of other civil society organisations[9] to host a three-day workshop in Juba on strengthening civil society participation and action on community security and arms control issues. The workshop brought together over 50 national CSOs operating across Southern Sudan, including youth and women's groups, church groups, media, peace and community organisations, as well as representatives from the international community and GoSS, including the Vice President, His Excellency Riek Machar. Its twin objectives were to identify opportunities for civil society engagement in this area and agree a common statement of intent among participants.

Five main outcomes from this workshop can be identified. Firstly the workshop provided an opportunity to introduce the concept of community security and arms control and related issues to local CSOs. Many of these concepts were new to participants who were however clearly knowledgeable of the problems surrounding insecurity across Southern Sudan. The workshop also presented an opportunity to introduce the CSSAC Bureau and its area of work, raising its profile amongst civil society members who would potentially be working alongside it in the future.

Secondly, the workshop created a space for further discussions amongst civil society members on the effects of small arms and insecurity in their communities, their role and ability to share this information, what impact security interventions have had on communities and what role civil society has to play in addressing community insecurity. A commitment was made by representatives from the international community to support civil society in its next steps and facilitate future groupings of civil society

9 Assistance Mission for Africa (AMA), Bonn International Centre for Conversion (BICC), Christian Aid, Dan Church Aid (DCA), Fellowship of Christian Councils and Churches in the Great Leaks and Horn of Africa (FECCLAHA), New Sudan Indigenous NGO Network (NESI), Nuer Peace Council, Norwegian Church Aid (NCA), PACT Sudan, Pax Christi Small Arms Survey (SAS), Southern Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), Southern Sudanese Youth Participation Association (SSYPA), Sudan Council of Churches (SCA), and World Vision.

actors, which was an important outcome for CSOs concerned about the limitations of current resources.

The workshop also led to agreement on a communiqué to the government which outlined civil society's concerns and priorities (see Annex 1). Among other things, the communiqué questioned the government's narrow approach to civilian disarmament and called for disarmament to be implemented in "an effective, transparent and co-ordinated manner" so as to ensure that collected weapons did not return to civilian hands.

The fifth and perhaps most important outcome was the establishment of a civil society Task Force, which would drive the process forward. One of the priorities for action identified was the need to strengthen civil society's networking capacity to address community security and arms control issues. The meeting proposed the formation of a civil society Task Force with an overall goal of producing and presenting recommendations to strengthen civil society networking on community security and arms control issues. Seven civil society organisations were chosen by the participants to be members of the Task Force and carry out its mandate.[10] Three groups were chosen to cover three broad regions of Southern Sudan: Greater Equatoria, Greater Upper Nile and Greater Bahr el Ghazal. It was agreed that a further precondition to selection was that each member had to have knowledge and experience on small arms issues and/or civil society networking while being easily contactable.

Step three: Mobilising the Task Force

The seven Task Force members met formally for the first time in August 2008 to clarify its role and develop its terms of reference in a meeting facilitated by Saferworld with participation form Pax Christi, DCA and UNDP. The ToR outlined three main objectives for the Task Force:

1. Produce a detailed mapping of civil society networks in each region, in different thematic areas, and specifically in those relevant to community security and arms control.

2. Develop an understanding of best practices, and lessons learnt from civil society networks in Southern Sudan and identify opportunities for effective networking in the area of community security and arms control.

3. Identify the strengths and weaknesses of potential members of a civil society network on community security and arms control, and make recommendations regarding technical and other support required to strengthen such members.

With further research having been identified as necessary, research objectives and methods were discussed and agreement reached on the overall approach to be taken. Initial focal points would be contacted to identify known CSOs who would then be contacted and interviewed across the three main regions. A list of 25 questions was developed to provide guidance and ensure consistency in data collection. Some guiding principles for research were also agreed upon to ensure it was a participatory and inclusive process, was gender balanced, impartial and respected the organisations involved. Finally a format for reporting was agreed upon to ensure consistency. Work and budget plans were created by each of the three groups. It was agreed that a small research grant would be provided to cover the logistical costs of the process and that a contact person at Saferworld would consult and provide guidance to the Task Force groups if they needed it.

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10 The organisations were: New Sudan Indigenous NGO Network (NESI), Institute for the Promotion of Civil Society (IPCS), Southern Sudan Action Network on Small Arms (SSANSA), Standard Action Liaison Focus (SALF), Assistance Mission for Africa (AMA), Women Training and Participation Society (WTPS), Women Development Group (WDG).

The Southern Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SSRRC) and the Office of the Resident Co-ordinator (ORC), which are responsible for the co-ordination of humanitarian and developmental activities, were contacted to provide some initial information and contacts and also ensure the Task Force members could move freely across the area. Research was then carried out by the three Task Force groups across Greater Equatoria, Greater Upper Nile and Greater Bahr el Ghazal until November 2008, with an interim meeting in October to assess progress. Information was collected on the profile of known organisations and networks, their capacity, what thematic areas they focused on and their engagement on peace and security issues. Furthermore the legal, security and political environments they operated in were assessed as well as relationships with government. A SWOT analysis (strengths and weaknesses, opportunities and threats) was used to assess existing organisations and networks. In all, 103 CSOs were interviewed and focus group discussions were held in several areas.

The Task Force's research work had a number of strengths, including the breadth of its scope. The process was conducted by CSOs who would be involved in the formation of a network, providing a large degree of ownership over the process as they assessed the challenges other networks to inform decisions over the direction forward. Members also felt they had been well prepared and trained to carry out the process, and as a side effect, this also built the capacity of these organisations to conduct future research into community security and arms control issues. Some members felt that the very process of CSOs working together to carry out the research strengthened the relationship with one another and the network itself. Furthermore the process of conducting research bought the Task Force members into contact with a range of new CSOs and so itself represented networking process on a wider scale. Lastly the process provided an opportunity to start to raise awareness on community security and arms control issues. Task Force members were motivated by the fact that for many of the CSOs and communities they came into contact with, insecurity was an extremely important problem, and they were willing to share information and very interested in learning about community security and arms control.

"We could know more, make contacts and solidify the network. In many ways the research process networked the network."
Task Force Member, May 2009.

"The exercise ignited our enthusiasm and inspired interest. People felt committed once they saw the realities of the problems people faced in some areas and also that people across Sudan were working on similar issues and were very interested in a network."
Task Force Member, May 2009.

However some Task Force members felt that they needed more time and more resources to generate a comprehensive assessment over such a large area and research in many rural areas was still limited by transportation problems and insecurity. In some cases Task Force members had to assess their own organisations and networks which challenged the principle of impartiality and neutrality. Lastly, although the research considered the role and capacity of traditional leaders, it was felt that further investigation was still warranted in this area.

Step four: Task Force findings, recommendations and the re-establishment of SSANSA

In December 2008 Saferworld and its partners facilitated a meeting attended by 42 CSO members and a representative from the CSSAC Bureau. The meeting presented an opportunity for the Bureau to outline its recent developments and areas where civil society could collaborate. A panel discussion with two Bureau officials, two Task Force members and a representative from Saferworld allowed participants to ask questions and discuss community security and arms control issues in detail. The central point of the meeting was for the three Task Force groups to present their findings and recommendations. The main findings were:

■ Due to financial restrictions, the majority of CSOs in Southern Sudan acted as implementing partners to international agencies and local authorities rather than acting as independent advocacy groups with sustainable engagement on specific areas, which was seen as an obstacle to networking.

■ Individuals, rather than members, tended to be the drivers behind many CSOs meaning that once these people take employment elsewhere (often within GoSS) many organisations disappear or lose substantial capacity, a serious obstacle to a network's sustainability.

■ Even though very few CSOs were directly engaged on community security and arms control, around 40 percent contacted were involved in activities related to it (such as peacebuilding or human rights) and so co-ordination of their efforts through a network would have a positive impact. Furthermore many showed an interest in learning and getting more involved in community security and arms control.

■ Attempts at creating CSO networks in Southern Sudan have been on the whole weak. Some networks have even been duplicated by poorly co-ordinated efforts to strengthen civil society by international agencies.

■ Most existing networks lacked formal structure and working procedures. Most also limit their function to information sharing among members and only co-ordinate actions among themselves occasionally.

■ A number of CSO working groups already exist to co-ordinate organisations' work in different sectors. These informally come together to discuss issues and develop co-ordinated approaches.

■ Relations between civil society and government were on the whole cordial and significant space existed for collaboration and joint action, though misunderstandings are apparently common as to the appropriate role of civil society.

■ Constraints on civil society work on security issues were identified. These included the traditional sensitivity of government to outside involvement but also more practical problems related to resources, communication and limited availability of office space, transport and good personnel.

Based on the Task Force's analysis and recommendations, the meeting then debated key issues for the SSANSA network including: structure, focus activities, relationship with government, internal communication, membership criteria and governance arrangements. It was agreed that the name of the original SSANSA network would be retained to aid recognition, for although this meant re-working a dormant structure and re-appointing many members, the network had a draft constitution that could be revised and the necessary geographic coverage.

Members also agreed that the network should be decentralised, with Focal Points in each state overseen by Steering Committees at both state- and Juba-level. Until state-level committees and focal points could be established, members volunteered to act as state focal points. However, a central Steering Committee of seven members, including at least one women's, one youth and one faith-based group, was to be established immediately. A General Meeting composed of all members of the network meeting once a year would be its highest decision-making organ and oversee the Steering Committee, endorse policies and documents, elect members to the Steering Committee and identify state-level focal points.

Eventually a central secretariat of limited powers should be established to manage resources and help network members with tasks such as research and capacity building. In the interim, members were encouraged to volunteer their support to the Steering Committee and to hold joint meetings and activities and share information among themselves and engage where possible with GoSS and other relevant regional and international networks.

The participants at the meeting committed themselves to becoming members of the new SSANSA while the old SSANSA members relinquished their posts. Through

consensus the participants then nominated and selected organisations to fill the Central Steering Committee. With the exception of one CSO[11], the members of the Task Force were selected for this role. Ten organisations were selected to be state-level focal points (see Annex 2).

"Unlike previous efforts at similar things now we have structures of governance that really work and it is a legitimate structure too."
Steering Committee Member, May 2009.

Agreement on these points and guiding principles established an interim framework within which SSANSA could immediately begin to work. While the original SSANSA lacked membership and capacity, the network was to a degree revitalised. Participants felt happy with the structure that came out of the meeting, especially the fact that it would mitigate some of the logistical problems associated with prior efforts. The core groups that led the Task Force process moved the network forward through becoming Central Steering Committee members and being able to implement their recommendations. At the same time, the existence of focal points meant that it would not become overly Juba-centric. Finally, the presence of CSSAC Bureau representatives at the meeting and specifically alongside two Task Force civil society representatives on the panel signalled a willingness to collaborate.

Step five: Developing a strategy

At the end of April 2009, Saferworld and its partners facilitated a three day workshop attended by the SSANSA Central Steering Committee and the 10 focal point representatives from each of the states to begin developing a three year strategy for the network, covering among other things a vision, mission, objectives and core values. A mission and vision were both agreed at the workshop:

Vision: *We would like to see a united, peaceful, democratic and prosperous Southern Sudan that is free of the threat of small arms where the human rights are protected and respected.*

Mission: *Enhancing the capacity of CSOs so as to be able to influence a formulation of policies on small arms, community security; to create awareness on the dangers of small arms; advocate for peaceful coexistence amongst and between communities in Southern Sudan.*

A strategy paper was compiled in the weeks following the meeting which drew on the discussions held over the three days and sought to lay out how the network could implement its mission and contribute to its vision for Southern Sudan. Workshop participants developed five core aims:

1. Enhance the capacity of CSOs to influence the formation of GoSS policies and laws that regulate the demand and use of small arms and effect wider community security issues.

2. Contribute to the development of networks in Southern Sudan and the region and link with international networks, researchers and advocates to encourage partnerships.

3. Conduct and support research efforts, documentation and the dissemination of this information with GoSS and other stakeholders.

4. Enhance education and civic awareness amongst communities to change attitudes on small arms and their use.

5. Support collaborative efforts between law enforcement agencies and communities to stem insecurity.

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11 The Women Development and Training Organisation was not on the Steering Committee. The Greater Tonj Youth Union, not in the original Task Force, was nominated instead.

To meet these aims five core areas of activity were identified which were to lobby and advocate, conduct research, work for the integration of community security and arms control concerns into other sectors (e.g. development assistance), identify potential partners and build strategic partnerships. In addition to the agreement of a strategy during the workshop, a programme framework was developed alongside some progress markers to guide the network's activities over the next three years. Establishing a strong secretariat and filling key posts such as that of Chairperson were seen as immediate priorities. A number of capacity needs were also identified, to be addressed during the lifetime of the strategy.

Box 3: Civil society actions against small arms in Nimule, Eastern Equatoria

As in many parts of Southern Sudan, inter-communal cattle raids and agro-pastoralist conflicts are recurrent problems for communities in Nimule, Eastern Equatoria. But the area is also home to large numbers of returnees and internally displaced people (IDPs) who fled to the area during the civil war.

Local civil society organisations, including the Catholic Church, have been working for a number of years to resolve conflicts and reduce tensions between long-term residents, returnees and IDPs. But this task is made more difficult by periodic outbreaks of armed violence and crime, in turn made possible by the ready availability of small arms to most households.

In June 2009, SSANSA members from Nimule jointly organised a series of activities designed to change public attitudes and behaviour in the area towards small arms. Working together with the Catholic Church and members of the Kenyan and Ugandan Action Networks on Small Arms (UANSA and KANSA), SSANSA members began advocating for gun free elections in Sudan and Uganda in a series of public events synchronised with a global 'week of action' co-ordinated by the International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). Activities included ecumenical prayer services for victims of armed violence, a football tournament for youth, and a public march by campaigners through Nimule. The week also saw the official launch of 'Elections without Guns', a Southern Sudan-wide campaign aimed at creating awareness on the dangers of gun violence during the election process, which drew support from the County Commissioner, Payam Judge and area police chief.

According to SSANSA members, those who joined the campaign events understand that efforts to bring small arms under control in the area must be long-term, focused and co-ordinated with actions by peace-builders and the Government of Southern Sudan. But in the words of Father Joseph Mawa of St Patrick Parish, Nimule, they must also "touch the hearts of the people", many of whom live in fear of their neighbours and the future that awaits them.

Sources: Interviews with representatives of the Jesuit Relief Services Nimule; Seventh Day Adventist Youth Association, Nimule; Youth and Life, Nimule; and St Patrick Parish, Nimule; Catholic Diocese of Torit, 23/08/09; 'Week of Action 2009', International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA), available at: http://www.iansa.org/campaigns_events/WoA2009/Africa.htm

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The strategy development and formation process was important in laying a direction for SSANSA in the next three years to which its members could agree and use to guide their activities. The identification of capacity development as a core strategy importantly recognised SSANSA's current limitations. The strategy's emphasis on building relationships and influencing other actors and partners, who are not necessarily focused on community security and arms control issues but were related to them recognised where it could be most effective. Indeed to a large degree the strategy developed is a holistic one which recognises the interconnectedness of tackling community security and arms control issues. Identifying some immediate activities meant that a sense of momentum could be established quickly after the workshop.

3

Next steps

IN ADDITION TO STATING ITS MISSION, VISION AND GUIDING PRINCIPLES, SSANSA's strategy document lays out the network's objectives and areas of intervention over the next three years.

In the short to medium term, detailed research into the nature of small arms proliferation problem in Southern Sudan was identified as a priority, covering the distribution, movement and usage of weapons, their societal impact and also cultural attitudes towards their possession and use. An advocacy campaign linked to the available evidence is also identified as important, targeting not only the general public with a view to changing attitudes and behaviours, but key government actors who could do more to take account of human security as opposed to national security.

Over the longer term, forging partnerships with GoSS institutions and in some cases implementing joint activities was seen as strategically important. Supporting any GoSS programme for community-based policing and participating in consultations on security policy and legislation in collaboration with the Peace and Reconciliation Committee in the Southern Sudan Legislative Assembly (SSLA) were specifically identified. At the grass-roots level, the strategy commits members to develop techniques for community-based mobilisation against small arms.

SSANSA will however require significant investment and support in coming years if it is to implement its strategy successfully. The following are some of the obvious areas where outsiders should target their support to the network:

- **Developing joint projects** Organisations, particularly those working in areas related to community security and arms control (e.g. peacebuilding, access to justice or security sector reform), should consult with SSANSA and seek out opportunities for collaboration in areas identified by SSANSA's strategic plan.

- **Policy dialogue** Where relevant and possible, SSANSA should be sought out as a partner for GoSS and international actors for the purposes of policy dialogue and related advocacy. Its broadly representative membership and geographical spread make it a useful and legitimate body to consult on policy, legal and strategy issues.

- **Capacity building and knowledge transfer** Other organisations working in areas relevant to community security and arms control, or with experience of civil society capacity building, advocacy and networking, could commit to sharing knowledge and experiences with SSANSA. The network will require ongoing capacity building both on thematic issues and key functions (e.g. research, advocacy) for some years to come.

- **Support to network profiling** The network will also require some help in raising its profile among government actors working on security issues at different levels and also within regional and international fora.

■ **Financing and support for resource mobilisation** In the first instance, this should be directed at the formation of a limited secretariat and providing office facilities. Thereafter, financial support should probably be directed at state level and earmarked both for project activities together with adequate support costs, provided proposed initiatives are in line with SSANSA's strategic plan. In the medium term, network members will require help with preparing a fundraising strategy, including forging links with international donors.

In view of the above needs, Saferworld continues to provide direct support to SSANSA as part of its Southern Sudan work programme. Recent activities have included supporting (together with IKV Pax Christi) SSANSA members in Eastern Equatoria state to co-ordinate activities with Ugandan and Kenyan counterparts, through joint planning and cross-border exchange meetings (see boxes 4 and 5).

> **Box 4: Civil society exchange visit to Nairobi**
>
> Building on a previous visit to Uganda and with support from Saferworld, a group of SSANSA representatives completed a study tour to Nairobi from 23–29 August 2009. The exposure of Southern Sudan civil society organisations to a different environment helped enhance their understanding of issues and provided practical examples for responding to situations of similar concern, including: the relationship between community security and arms control; methods of fundraising; independent operations and interventions; and ways of interacting with government and other partners. Also discussed were appropriate ways to develop methods of policy inter-vention. The exchange also created links between SSANSA and Kenyan civil society organisations working on related issues including those working along Kenya's northern borders with Southern Sudan.

> **Box 5: Developing cross-border dialogue on arms control with Uganda**
>
> From 3–7 August 2009, Saferworld and IKV Pax Christi co-sponsored a meeting in Kapoeta, Eastern Equatoria state, to address cross-border arms control and insecurity. The meeting marked the formation of the Eastern Equatoria Action Network on Small Arms (EE-ANSSA) and opened EE-ANSA's planning for initiating local collaboration on community security and arms control issues across international borders with Kenyan and Ugandan actors. EE-ANSA members are now developing their own localised strategy for the coming period, linked to national level SSANSA plans.

However, those wishing to support civil society action on small arms and community security not only need to match the efforts of SSANSA's members in building the network's skill-base, capacity and profile, but also to continue linking the network to other supportive organisations and other relevant initiatives. Assisting SSANSA in its efforts to complement the work of GoSS institutions, including the CSSAC Bureau, SPLA and SSPS is of course a priority. But links also need to be forged now with new initiatives in the area of security and justice, such as the Safety and Access to Justice (SAJP) and the Security Sector Development and Defence Transformation (SSDDT) programmes now being implemented by GoSS with UK Government support.

In order to carry through on its stated commitment to civil society in the area of community security and arms control, Saferworld intends to continue providing both direct and indirect support to SSANSA in the period 2009–2011. We would encourage others working on similar issues to also take account of SSANSA and consider how best they can contribute to its growth in coming years.

Communiqué from civil society workshop on CSAC, March 2008

We, representatives of civil society from across Southern Sudan, met in Juba from the 11th to 13th March 2008 at the Juba Raha Hotel to discuss the problems of community security and arms control, coordinated by Saferworld. We analysed and considered the problems of small arms and insecurity in Southern Sudan. In this communiqué, we raise our concerns to the Government of Southern Sudan about their proposed strategies and actions, our concerns about insecurity and disarmament processes and our recommendations.

The workshop was opened by H. E. Dr Riek Machar Teny, Vice President of the Government of Southern Sudan. Dr Machar introduced the newly formed Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) Bureau based in the Office of the Vice President.

The Vice President mentioned that the SSDDRC is tasked with overseeing the disarmament of the ex-SPLA combatants, while the CSAC Bureau has been established to handle the civilian aspects of disarmament. The Vice President also outlined the mechanisms and strategies that will be put in place by the Government of Southern Sudan to guide the disarmament process, which will be led by the CSAC Bureau.

We, civil society representatives, welcome the creation of the CSAC Bureau and the high-level commitment it represents by GoSS to effectively tackle insecurity in our communities.

We welcome the peaceful mechanisms and strategies to guide disarmament presented by the Vice President, however we are concerned that these should be implemented in an effective, transparent and coordinated manner.

We welcome the Government's efforts to enhance security through strengthening the operational capacity of Law Enforcement Agencies and the creation of buffer zones. We believe that civil society and communities have an important role to play in ensuring that these measures are appropriate and accepted.

We are concerned that some of the weapons collected in previous disarmament exercises have not been sufficiently secured and these weapons have found their way back into civilian hands. Hence, we recommend the effective storage and destruction of all weapons acquired during disarmaments.

We welcome the Government's recognition that "Southern Sudanese civil society organizations have an immensely important role to play in the disarmament campaign". We request that the Government work in partnership with civil society in developing and implementing its policies and strategies to ensure the security of people across Southern Sudan. Mechanisms for civil society to be represented and participate in these processes should be established at both the GoSS and State levels.

We recognise the limitations of civil society in Southern Sudan and the transitional areas. We call upon donors and development partners to work with us to enable civil society to play a full role. We are concerned that current funding mechanisms are not leading to service delivery in our communities and are not conducive to supporting local organisations.

We have also discussed our role as civil society and how we can contribute to enhancing security and arms control. We have agreed to enhance the coordination of our efforts at all levels.

We welcome the opportunity to discuss the outcomes of this workshop with the Government and with development partners. This workshop will recommend representatives for this purpose.

The original document has been signed by the organisations and individuals present at the meeting.

Guiding principles for the Civil Society Network on Community Security and Small Arms

Preamble

We, the representative members of civil society concerned about community security in Southern Sudan, having met in Juba, Oasis Camp, on the 10–12 December 2008, and deliberated on community security and small arms issues for three days, acknowledge that establishing security is necessary for development, improving lives, developing opportunities for individuals, and the promotion of democracy and good governance, and there is a need to raise issues of concern to the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) for the promotion of peace and stability. Community security is threatened by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons, and a range of other issues, which threatens the stability and security of communities.

The above mentioned representatives of civil society seek to maximize the potential for action to combat the threats posed by the proliferation of small arms and other threats to community security. The undersigned agree, through these guiding principles, to establish an organized structure to engage with the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), other actors, and the communities of Southern Sudan to address such issues through advocacy, awareness raising, contributing to policy development, and conducting specific activities in a coordinated manner to improve community security and arms control in Southern Sudan.

This document provides interim guidelines on the proposed structure and principles of a Southern Sudan-wide civil society network to combat the threat of small arms and tackle insecurity in communities.

The need for a civil society network on Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC)

It has been recommended to establish a civil society network on CSAC.

Geographic coverage

The network shall cover all ten states in Southern Sudan.

The Name

The network will be represented by the name "Southern Sudan Action Network on Small Arms" (SSANSA).

Key initial steps and role

A specific Terms of Reference (ToR) for the network will be developed, establishing the role and activities of the network. It will include the development of a Steering Committee to guide all activities of a Secretariat and hold the Secretariat and members of the network accountable for its activities. A Constitution will also be formed.

Initially, and simply, the network will:

- Cover the geographic region of all Southern Sudan, as implied by the network's name
- Strengthen civil society networking on CSAC issues,
- Develop a draft Constitution that defines its mandate through the Steering Committee (see later), and endorsed by the members.
- Discuss the possibility of extending the role to cover the Three Areas

Membership

The membership criteria of the network shall be non-discriminatory in any manner. Membership is open to all fitting the below criteria. Members should or can be:

- CSOs recognized by law and the community, and involved in CSAC issues.
- Non-partisan.
- Organizational and not individual.
- Other networks and academic institutions that deal with CSAC issues.
- Special consideration: The Steering Committee has the option to allow members that do not fulfil the criteria in exceptional circumstances if deemed that the potential member would contribute significantly to the effectiveness of the network.

Members will be requested to contribute an annual membership/subscription fee to be defined in the Constitution.

Structure

The network should be decentralized but have a Southern Sudan Focal Point or Secretariat in Juba. The network at the State level should be semi-autonomous and should have Focal Points at their respective locations (office) in the states. This structure is expected to eventually run down to county and payam levels.

The proposed and agreed structure will be detailed in the Constitution when developed.

Management Structure

The following should comprise the management structure of the network:

General Meeting

This will be the highest decision-making organ that is composed of all the members of the network. The General Meeting will have the following functions:

- Assess the performance of the Steering Committee, and take appropriate action based on consensus.
- Approve and endorse policies and other relevant documents
- Elect the members of the Steering Committee, based on the criteria established within these guidelines for membership.
- Meet annually
- Initially, identify Liaison Persons (to become the Focal Point when feasible) at the State level.

Steering Committee, Central and State levels

Steering Committees should be formed in Juba immediately and at a later date in each state.

A body will be developed to guide the work of the network. The body will be agreed upon by the members present at the first General Meeting, and adopted at the General Meeting to represent the functions and coordination mechanisms of the network across Southern Sudan (Central level Steering Committee), and at the states (State level Steering Committee). The Steering Committee will be ultimately accountable to the General Meeting, the body consisting of all the members of the network.

The Steering Committees will ensure the effective functioning of governance, through advocacy, related to community security and arms control based on guidance provided to the network Secretariat and its members.

Initially, in the absence of a functioning Steering Committee at the State level currently, a Liaison Person will be established in each state to carry out the roles of the Steering Committee and develop the capacity of the Steering Committee. The functions will be:

- Develop strategic plans and policies
- Meet monthly, or *ad hoc* and as necessary depending on issues.
- Raise funds for activities
- Improve internal and external relations

- Lobby, advocate and raise awareness to the government and the people of Southern Sudan
- Recommend specific activities to the Secretariat
- Draft the Constitution and other relevant policies and documents
- Appoint senior Secretariat staff
- Scrutinize and approve if applicable, applications for membership

Criteria for Steering Committee membership

- The Steering Committee will comprise seven (7) member organizations;
- They must have been involved in CSAC issues before;
- It should reflect regional representation,
- The steering committee members must be based in Juba or able to travel to Juba when and as needed,
- They should have outreach activities,
- At least one member should be a women's organization;
- At least one member should be a youth organization;
- At least one member should be a church or religious institution.

Criteria for State Steering Committees

- As Juba Steering Committee;
- Must be based in or around the location of the state office for network activities

The Secretariat (Central Level)

The Secretariat should be identified by the Steering Committee (Central Level) to:

- Run the day-to-day activities of the network
- Coordinate joint activities and source and share information
- Plan and execute programmes according to approved mandate of the network
- To manage resources and assets in accordance with the policy
- To prepare meeting agendas and organizational issues
- Coordinate with network members and committees at all levels
- Research opportunities and where possible organize capacity building options for network members

Secretariat at the State levels

One person will be identified initially as a liaison person, in the absence of the Steering Committee. This individual will establish a Steering Committee at the State level, which will then identify a Focal Point to be the permanent (limited duration) individual to act as the liaison person at the state level with the Secretariat (Central level). The positions will be voluntary.

Initially, the Liaison Person will establish contacts with members of the network, and other organizations associated with CSAC-related activities at the county, payam and boma level.

The Liaison Person should identify an office location, or similar, in which to locate the network's operations. The Liaison Person (Focal Point) will have the following functions:

- Coordinate joint activities and source and share information.
- Present a monthly report to the Secretariat (Central Level)
- Raise issues seen to be of an urgent nature in regard to community insecurity, or potential community insecurity
- Liaise regularly with the Secretariat (Central Level)
- Contribute to financial expenditure and reporting to the General Meeting as appropriate

Registration

The network will be registered as a legal entity in Southern Sudan with appropriate policies developed and a Constitution approved by the General Meeting. These developments are necessary for the registration of the network.

Strengthening the network

- In order to strengthen the network, especially during its formation/establishment period, members are encouraged to consider volunteering where and when necessary.

- The network Steering Committees should devise ways through which they would strengthen the capacity of its members e.g. mandating them to implement specific activities on behalf of the network.

- Implementing regular joint activities

- Enhance communication through consistent meetings (especially by the steering committees) and other forums (that may also include government)

- Regular information sharing and updates. This will be done transparently and overseen and guided by the Steering Committees and all the members through the General Meeting.

Engagement with the Government

The network should ensure adequate engagement with the government, law enforcement agencies, legislators and other relevant bodies at the central and local level following development of its Constitution and agreement on activities and approaches to advocacy. It should also ensure that it is represented and/or participates in government CSAC processes at various levels. It should also engage with other intergovernmental organizations dealing with CSAC issues.

Engagement with other actors

The network should adequately engage with sub-regional, regional and international CSAC networks when appropriate, to strengthen mechanisms for regional cooperation, and strengthen advocacy approaches to the government on CSAC.

Organisations nominated as State-level Focal Points and Central Steering Committee members, December 2008

Central Steering Committee members

	ORGANISATION	SCOPE OF OPERATION
1	Shalom Sudan	Equatoria Region with base in Juba
2	NESI Network	Southern Sudan wide, with base in Juba
3	Institute for Promotion of Civil Society	Equatoria Region with base in Yei
4	Women Development Group	Greater Bahar el Gazel, with liaison base in Juba
5	Greatest Tonj Youth Union	Greater Bahar el Gazel, with liaison base in Juba
6	Assistance Mission Africa	Greater Upper Nile, with liaison base in Juba
7	Standard Action Liaison Focus	Greater Upper Nile with liaison base in Juba

State Focal Points

S/N	STATE (FOCAL POINT)	ORGANISATION
	Greater Equatoria Region	
1	Central Equatoria	Reconcile
2	Eastern Equatoria	ALL Palms
3	Western Equatoria	Catholic Diocese of Tombora Yambio
	Greater Bahar el Gazel Region	
4	Western Bahar el Gazel	Women Development Group
5	Lakes States	Bhar Elgazal Youth Development Agency
6	Northern Bahar el Gazel	MKS
7	Warab	Greater Tonji Youth Union
	Greater Upper Nile Region	
9	Upper Nile	Fashoda Youth Forum
10	Unity	Southern Sudan Orphan Care Organization
11	Jonglei	Jonglei State Women's Union

Task Force Report

The need for a civil society network on Community Security and Arms Control (CSAC) – The Task Force (TF) recommends establishment of a civil society network on CSAC.

Geographic coverage TF recommends that the network should cover the whole of Southern Sudan.

The Name TF recommends that the name "Southern Sudan Action Network on Small Arms" (SSANSA) be used for the network because:

- The name already implies the geographic coverage,
- It was primarily formed to strengthen civil society networking on CSAC issues,
- It already has a draft constitution that defines its mandate
- It is already recognized in some areas and by other sub-regional and international civil society organizations such as Eastern Africa Action Network on Small Arms (EAANSA), International Action Network on Small Arms (IANSA). However, since SSANSA already exists, it is necessary that it be re-established.

Membership The members of re-established SSANSA should be CSOs recognized by law and the community and are involved in CSAC issues. They should be non-partisan. Membership should be organizational and not individual. Other networks and academic institutions that deal with CSAC issues should be considered for membership.

Structure The network should be decentralized but have a Southern Sudan Focal Point or Secretariat in Juba. The States should be semi-autonomous and should equally have Focal Points at their respective headquarters. This structure is expected to eventually run down to counties levels.

Management Structure The following should comprise the management structure of the network:

- General Meeting
- Steering Committee: Juba and State levels
- Secretariat: Juba and State levels

General Meeting An annual General meeting should be convened for network members.

Steering Committee Steering Committees should be formed in Juba and in each state.

Criteria for Juba Steering Committee

- It must comprise a maximum of seven (7) member organizations;
- They must have been involved in CSAC issues before;
- It should reflect regional representation,
- The steering committee members must be based in Juba or able to travel to Juba when and as needed,
- They should have outreach activities,
- At least one member should be a women organization;
- At least one member should be a church or religious institution.

Criteria for State Steering Committees

- As Juba Steering Committee;
- Must be based in or around state headquarters
- Both steering committees should be representative and inclusive

Steering Committees should fundraise among network members as well as from its partners for the implementation of joint activities. This would entail development of a comprehensive fundraising strategy for the network. However, members should continue fundraising for their independent activities.

Steering Committee meeting The steering committees should meet regularly at their respective levels preferably every month or when need be

Secretariat/Focal points

- There should be a secretariat/focal point at Juba and in all state levels;
- However, until funds are available to run and independent secretariat, one of the steering committee members should act as the focal point.
- The main role of the secretariat/focal point is to coordination joint activities and source and share information.
- In order to strengthen each member's coordination ability, the focal point should rotate among the steering committee after a pre-determined period of time.

Activities of the network The steering committees should meet to decide on specific activities immediately after these recommendation have been adopted. The activities should reflect the purpose of the network and arrived at after consultation with members.

Overall, some of the activities to be undertaken include – contribute towards CSAC e.g. contribute towards disarmament policy; awareness raising on CSAC issues; capacity building for members on CSAC issues e.g. through ToT.

Registration TF strongly recommends that SSANSA be formalized through registration; formulation of policies and constitutions, etc in order to enjoy the benefits of legal entities.

Strengthening the network

- In order to strengthen the network, especially during its formative or reestablishment period, members are encouraged to consider volunteering where and when necessary.
- The network steering committees should devise ways through which they would strengthen the capacity of its members e.g. mandating them to implement specific activities on behalf of the network.
- Implementing regular joint activities
- Enhance communication through consistent meetings (especially by the steering committees) and other forums (that may also include government)
- Regular information sharing and updates

Engagement with the government Since CSAC issues are primarily government issues, the network should ensure adequate engagement with the government, law enforcement agencies and legislators. It should also ensure that it represented/participates in government CSAC processes at various levels. It should also engage with other inter-governmental organizations such as Regional Centre on Small Arms (RECSA).

Engagement with other actors SSANSA should adequately engage with sub-regional, regional and international CSAC networks such as EAANSA (and its other national chapters that border Southern Sudan such as Uganda Action Network on Small Arms, Kenya Action Network on Small Arms, DRC Action Network on Small Arms and Ethiopia Action Network on Small Arms) and IANSA.

Saferworld works to prevent and reduce violent conflict and promote co-operative approaches to security. We work with governments, international organisations and civil society to encourage and support effective policies and practices through advocacy, research and policy development and through supporting the actions of others.

COVER PHOTO: Southern Sudanese women and children displaced by armed attacks.
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